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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
applicability of existing American obscenity law, based on 
local community standards, to the problem of policing 
obscenity in cyberspace.
Additionally, this paper critiques recent attempts to 
regulate obscenity in cyberspace and suggests alternatives 
which would allow constitutional and consistent regulation 
of obscenity on-line.
i v
CENSORSHIP, CYBERSPACE, AND COMMUNITY STANDARDS 
AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ON-LINE OBSCENITY
Introduction
"[0]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric"
- Justice John Harlan1 
Rapidly changing technologies have required that 
American laws evolve and expand to include new areas of 
conflict within their scope.2 Technology is like a 
frontier in that it is an area where old ideas, laws, and 
societal mores conflict with the realities of completely new
xCohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
2For example, the expansive use of telephones, cable 
television, and both radio and television broadcasting have 
created unique challenges for lawmakers and legal 
commentators alike. See, e.g.. Nicholas P. Miller & Joseph 
Van Eaton, A Review of Developments in Cases Defining the 
Scope of the First Amendment Rights of Cable Television 
Operators, 3 80 PLI/Pat 885 (March-April 1994); Steven 
Nudelman, A Chilly Wait in Radioland: The FCC Forces
"Indecent" Radio Broadcasters to Censor Themselves of Face 
the Music. 2 J.L. & Pol'y 115 (1994); Jeffrey L. Reed, 
Recent Development; Constitutional Law - First Amendment 
Protected for Indecent Speech - Dial-A-Porn. 57 Tenn. L.
Rev. 339, 363 (1989).
2
3and different situations. Cyberspace3 is such a 
technological frontier.4 Accordingly, it has been hailed
3,1 Cyber space" is a term which recently entered popular 
use to refer to the spatially undefinable area where 
electronic communications take place. See generally Edward 
J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer 
Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 Geo. L.J. 
409 (1992).
4The Internet, "a worldwide interlinked network of 
computers born in 1969 as ARPANET under the auspices of the 
U.S. Department of Defense," Kim Neely, Caught In The Net. 
Rolling Stone, December 1, 1994, at 63, was for nearly 
twenty years used primarily by military and university 
computer experts, as well as "a core group of computer elite 
- scientists, programmers, and hackers." Id. In recent 
years, the advent of commercial computer services like 
America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe have opened the 
Internet to anyone with access to a computer and a modem.
For some commentary on the subject of other developing 
legal issues on the Internet, see I. Trotter Hardy, The 
Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace". 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
993 (1994) (discussing the appropriate legal regime for
"cyberspace"; Rosalind Resnick, Cvbertort; The New Era;
The Rush to Use the Internet has Spawned a Host of Court 
Battles and a New Practice Area, The Nat'l L.J., Al, col. 2, 
July 18, 1994 (discussing on-line libel cases from 1991 to
4as the only form of media where a truly free exchange of 
ideas and commentary can exist.5 Such an exchange
the present, summarizing on-line trademark and contract 
litigation); Daniel Waggoner, Potholes on the "Information 
Superhighway". Practicing Law Institute: Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course 
Handbook Series, PLI Order No. G4-3918, March-April 1994.
5See M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and 
Technological Change: The New Media Have a Message. 57 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1459, 1481 (1989) (describes how electronic 
communication promotes self-fulfillment); Eric C. Jensen,
An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the
First Amendment. 39 Fed. Comm. L.J. 217, 224 (1987); Gina 
M. Garramone et al., Uses of Political Bulletin Boards. 3 0 
J. of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 325, 329 (1986);
Robert 0'Harrow, Jr., Computer-Friendly Homes Increasing: 
Electronic Bulletin Boards Provide Many Residents with 
Comfort. Communication. Wash. Post., Dec. 27, 1992, at Bl; 
Jammy Scott, On-Line, and Mavbe Out of Line, L.A. Times, 
Sept. 24, 1993, at Al (discussing the blunt forms on-line 
communication can take because of the relative anonymity of 
its users). All of the above are cited in Eric Schlatchter, 
Cyberspace, The Free Market, and the Free Marketplace of 
Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin
Board Functions. 16 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 87 (1993) .
See also David Landis, Sex, laws & cvberspace/Regulating
5includes, however, the exchange of thoughts and materials 
that many consider obscene.6
Many users of on-line systems argue that whether or 
not materials are obscene depends upon the perspective of 
the beholder. They agree with Justice Harlan's comment 
that, "it is largely because government officials cannot 
make principled distinctions in this area that the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to 
the individual.1,7
This paper will examine the applicability of existing 
American obscenity law, based on local community standards, 
to the problem of policing obscenity on the Internet, an 
international computer network which embraces people from 
innumerable communities. Part I of this paper gives a brief 
history of obscenity law in the United States. Part II 
discusses modern applications of community standards with 
regard to obscenity in different media. Part III explores 
the impact of the first on-line obscenity case and then 
investigates the debate on whether cyberspace should be 
treated as public or private space. Part IV discusses the 
inadequacy of recent on-line obscenity legislation, which is
porn; Does it cjompute?, USA Today, August 9, 1994 at p. ID 
6See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 83 9 F. 
Supp 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Joel Garreau, Bawdy Bvtes; The
Growing World of Cvbersex, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1993, at Al. 
7Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
6almost certainly unconstitutional, and asks how we can both 
constitutionally and consistently limit the exchange of 
otherwise protected communications in cyberspace.
A Brief History of Obscenity Laws in the United States 
Obscenity is a concept that Americans have found 
"notoriously difficult to define,"8 to the extent that even 
the Supreme Court has yet to arrive at a truly satisfactory 
description of what constitutes "obscenity."9 This 
frustration is probably best embodied by Justice Potter 
Stewart's famous comment: "[I] know it [obscenity] when I
8Donovan W. Gaede, Constitutional Law -- Policing the 
Obscene: Modern Obscenity Doctrine Re-evaluated, 18 S. 111.
U. L. J. 43 9. Justice Harlan wrote in Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 67 6, 704-5 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring), that no 
other subject has produced a greater variety of views among 
members of the United States Supreme Court than obscenity. 
Ginsberg. 390 U.S. at 704-5; Joseph T. Clarke, The 
"Community Standard" in the Trail of Obscenity Cases - A 
Mandate for Tgmp-i -r-i cal Evidence in Search of the Truth. 2 0 
Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 13, at 13 and fns. 1 & 2. In thirteen 
1960s cases, there were fifty-five separate opinions written 
by the nine Justices. Id.
9See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional 
Law, §16.59-61 (4th ed. 1991).
7
8see it."10
The Comstock Acts
Obscenity laws first appeared in America in the 187 0s 
when moral purity movements "link[ed] birth control to 
obscenity in the atmosphere surrounding the family in the 
Victorian United States."11 A New Yorker named Anthony 
Comstock was behind the reform effort; with the assistance 
of Vice President Henry Wilson and Supreme Court Justice 
William Strong, he drafted the first national obscenity 
statute.12 The Comstock Act became law on March 1, 1873.
The language of the Act makes it clear that Comstock 
had no qualms about legislating morality. The Act 
prohibited the "circulation and importation of obscene 
materials" through the U.S. mails, as well as banning all 
items designed "for preventing contraception or producing 
abortion."13 Violators were to be punished severely -- 
with a $5000 fine, a sentence of one to ten years hard 
labor, or both. Many states also passed their own versions, 
called "Little Comstock Acts."14
10Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
i:LKermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law and American
History (1989) at 161.
12Id.
13Id.
14Id.
9The Hicklin Test
Until 1957, the test for obscenity in other forms was 
taken from the 1868 British case of Regina v. Hicklin.15 
The Hicklin test for obscenity was based on the effects of 
certain paragraphs in a written pamphlet upon "particularly 
susceptible persons."16 The test found materials obscene 
if "the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to 
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such 
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of 
this sort may fall."17 This test, based on the effects 
obscenity could have on its audience, remained the law in 
the United States for nearly one hundred years.18
1SL.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), as discussed in P. Heath 
Brockwell, Grappling with Miller v. California: The Search
for an Alternative Approach to Regulating Obscenity. 24 
Cumb. L. Rev. 131 (1993-94). Brockwell suggests that Regina 
v. Hicklin finds its basis in Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep.
1146 (1663), considered the first reported Western obscenity 
case. See also the discussion of the Hicklin test in Gaede, 
supra note 8.
16Gaede, supra note 8.
17Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 at 371 (1868) .
18See, generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
Commissioner of Education of New York, et. al., 343 U.S. 495 
(1952); Dennis et. al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Winters
10
The Hicklin Test Repudiated, and the Creation of "Community 
Standards1
The Hicklin test was explicitly repudiated in the 1957 
Supreme Court decision Roth v. United States.19 Roth 
involved the case of a bookseller convicted for mailing 
obscene materials in violation of an existing federal 
statute.20 The Supreme Court upheld Roth's conviction and 
articulated, for the first time, a legal definition of 
obscenity21 which clearly placed it outside of the First 
Amendment's free speech protections.22
The Roth opinion states that "obscene material is 
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to 
prurient interest."23 Roth went on to clarify how courts 
were to identify what was legally obscene by determining if 
"to the average person, applying contemporary community
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Hannegan, Postmaster 
General v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946); Martin v. 
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Chaplinksy v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Price v. United States, 165 
U.S. 311 (1897); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 
(1896) .
19354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
20Id. at 480.
21Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
22See U.S. Const., amend. I.
23Roth, 354 U.S. 476 at 487 (footnote omitted).
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeals to the prurient interest."24 This test was 
based on the idea that individual geographic placement 
determined how Americans determined what constituted 
obscenity.25
The Justices, however, were not specific about what 
exactly the phrase "community standards" meant; 
consequently, the Supreme Court often found itself 
attempting to clarify its holding in the years immediately 
following Roth.26 Some Justices maintained that 
"contemporary community standards" really referred to some 
sort of national American standard.27 Others preferred use 
of a national standard only for federal prosecutions.28 
Miller v. California and the Modern Test for Obscenity
The legal wrangling over the vagueness of Roth
24Id. at 489.
25Id.
26Eg.. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 37 0 U.S. 478, 
488, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 8 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1962); 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 
1680-82, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1964); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 
U.S. 524, 90 S. Ct. 2241, 26 L. Ed. 782 (1970).
27Jacobellis. 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964) (Brennan, J. 
joined by Goldberg, J.).
28Manual Enterprises. 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Harlan 
J., joined by Stewart, J.).
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convinced the Court that it must articulate a clearer test 
for use on potentially obscene materials.29 A new three- 
part test for obscenity was promulgated in the 1973 case, 
Miller v. California.30 In Miller, the Court stated that 
materials in question must be viewed according to whether:
(a) "the average person, applying 'contemporary 
community standards' would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest"31;
(b) "the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined . 
by the applicable state law"32;
and (c) "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value."33
The Court stated that a national obscenity 
standard was unacceptable to the nation and would be 
impossible to administer:
[0]ur Nation is simply too big and too 
diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that 
such standards could be articulated for all fifty 
states in a single formulation34 . . . [To]
require a State to structure obscenity proceedings 
around evidence of a national "community standard" 
would be an exercise in futility35 . . . [I]t is
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to
29See Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9 at §16.60, 
discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) .
30413 U.S. 15 (1973) .
31Id. at 24.
32Id.
33Id. .
34Miller, 413 U.S. 15 at 23 (1973).
35Id. at 24.
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read the First Amendment as requiring that the 
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public 
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, 
or New York City."36
Although Chief Justice Burger argued the practical 
difficulties of determining a single national standard, he 
ignored the even more immense logistical nightmare that the 
formulation and application of local obscenity standards 
created for the courts. What constitutes obscenity in one 
part of the country - or one part of the county - could be 
perfectly legal and acceptable in another.37 But Burger, 
like Chief Justice Warren before him, clearly indicated in 
Miller that the "community standards" doctrine means that 
standards for acceptable levels of obscenity are to be set 
at the local level.38 This remains the law of the land 
today.39 Generally, legal definitions of "obscenity" are
36Id. at 32.
37Id. at 24.
38The Miller test gives "community standards" a more 
literal meaning than in the Roth decision by explicitly 
delegating to the jury the determination of what constitutes 
obscenity: "[I]n resolving the inevitable sensitive
questions of fact and law, we must continue to rely on the 
jury system . . . ." Miller, 413 U.S. at 26 (1973) (quoted 
in Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9).
39See, e.g. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 464, 470 (1994); Rhoden v. Morgan, 863 F. Supp.
14
narrow, describing what most Americans would consider "hard­
core pornographic expression.1,40
612, 617-18 (1994); United States v. Caver, 41 M.J. 556, 
561 (1994) (all citing the Miller test the current standard 
for defining obscenity for First Amendment purposes).
40Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech In An Open Society 
(1992) at 324-25.
Modem Applications of Community Standards
While technology has changed the way we communicate,41 
it has not altered how we evaluate obscenity,42 which 
receives no First Amendment protection because of its 
content, regardless of the medium by which it is 
communicated.43 Eventually, any legal debate about 
regulating obscenity in cyberspace reaches the point where 
one must confront the stone wall of community standards. 
Although we live in an age where modernization arguably 
tends to destroy all that is purely local in any community, 
due to the dominance of influences that originate from 
outside the locality, the community standards doctrine
41For example, within the past five years, the 
electronic bulletin boards of the Internet have "become a 
favorite stomping ground for millions of people." Neely, 
supra note 4 at 63. There are approximately 45,000 such 
bulletin boards, being used by "literally millions of 
people." Computer Porn A Prosecutorial challenge;
Cyberspace Smut Easy to Distribute. Difficult to Track, Open 
to Legal Questions. ABA Journal, December 1994, at 40.
42See recent cases discussed supra note 39.
43See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
930 (2d ed. 1988) .
15
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applies to every mode of communication.44 One legal 
scholar has concluded that the multimedia revolution which 
created "cyberspace" will likely stretch our "legal 
creativity" to the limit, but notes that the First Amendment 
has accommodated new technologies before and will likely be 
able to do so again.45 
The Message in the Medium
The development of new technologies has resulted in a 
hierarchy of First Amendment applications to differentiate 
between electronic and print media.46 The Supreme Court 
has stated that "differences in the characteristics of new 
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards 
applied to them. "47 This hierarchical approach has been 
explained by the intrusive nature of certain media like 
radio, telephone solicitation, and broadcast television.48 
Thus, the nature of the Internet's technological structure
44See. e.g.. Sable Communications of California, Inc. 
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (dial-a-porn); FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), rehearing denied 439 U.S. 
883 (197 8) (radio broadcasting).
45Waggoner, supra note 4.
46The Message in the Medium, 107 Harvard I*. Rev. 1062 
(1994) .
47Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 3 95 U.S. 3 67, 3 86 
(1969) .
48See. e.g. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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is likely to color any future determination by the Court of 
what constitutes obscenity in electronic media. 49 The 
question of what form# if any, censorship of cyberspace 
should take is complicated by the fact that it combines 
elements of print, broadcast, and telephone media. How 
obscenity has been dealt with in those contexts can 
illuminate how it should be regulated in cyberspace.
Print Media
The Court ruled in Kaplan v. California50 that although 
"a book seems to have a different and preferred place in our 
hierarchy of values,"51 books could be found obscene by the 
content of their words alone.52 The Court also found that 
the contemporary community standards were the appropriate
49The question of what form censorship, if it is to be 
applied to the Internet, should take is complicated by the 
fact that a fundamental question about the nature of 
interactive media has yet to be resolved: should it be
regulated like other forms of mass communication? See John 
F. Dickerson & Douglas Root, Censoring Cyberspace: Carnegie
Mellon7s Attempt to Ban Sex From Its Campus Computer Network 
Sends A Chill Along the Info Highway, Newsweek, November 21, 
1994, 102, 103.
50413 U.S. 115, 116 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 
883 (1973) .
51Id. at 119.
52Id.
18
means by which to determine what constituted an obscene 
book.53
Courts have not, however, required bookstores, as 
"secondary distributors of information,1,54 to be familiar 
with the contents of every title they stock55 in order to 
keep clear of local obscenity ordinances. Additionally, 
prior restraints on other forms of print media, generally 
disfavored by the Court,56 are.often upheld in obscenity 
cases, although censoring authorities must first meet 
stringent requirements and have the determination of 
obscenity made by a local court.57
53Id. at 121. Kaplan, id. at 115, was decided after 
but during the same term as Miller. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) .
54Message, supra note 46 at 1067. Computers also fit 
into this category if one considers their functions as 
"bulletin boards" and information services. The analogy is 
particularly apt when applied to information downloaded from 
databases: games, journals, images, etc. Id.
55In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the 
Court held that the First Amendment prohibits prosecution of 
a bookseller unless he or she has "knowledge of the contents 
of the book." Id. at 153.
56See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963) .
57In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the 
Court required a local censorship board attempting to revoke
19
Broadcast Radio and Television
Broadcast radio and television stations are regulated by 
the Federal Communications Commission,58 which controls59
the license of a book and motion-picture distributor's to 
follow certain specific procedural safeguards before they 
could "engage in the prior restraint of allegedly obscene 
materials." Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9, at §16.61 (c). 
The Court required that the censoring body:
(1)Afford the accused part a prompt hearing,
(2)Has the burden of showing that the material is, 
in fact, obscene,
(3)Must defer to a judicial proceeding for the 
imposition of a valid prior restraint on the 
material, and
(4)Must either refrain from making a finding of 
obscenity, or, as a requirement of law under the 
board's enabling statute or clear judicial 
mandate, take action on its own behalf in a court 
of law to seek an affirmation of its initial 
finding of obscenity. Id.
Nowak and Rotunda note that it is unlikely that this rule on 
prior restraints would apply if only books were involved.
Id. at fn 27.
58See. e.g.. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (a) (1988)(granting FCC
the right to license radio and television operators due to 
the limited number of frequencies available on the 
electromagnetic spectrum used for broadcasting).
59The FCC cannot, however, engage in "censorship." 47 
U.S.C.A. § 326. Another statutory provision, however, 
requires the Commission to prohibit "obscene, indecent, or
20
what can be broadcast over public airwaves. Most Supreme 
Court decisions in this area evince the Court's concern 
about broadcast's unique pervasiveness and its accessibility 
to children.60 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,61 the Court 
upheld the Commission's ban on obscene speech, while 
allowing the Commission only a limited right to regulate 
"indecent" speech.
Obscene broadcasts are prohibited by the FCC's enabling 
act,62 but it offers no definition of obscenity more 
specific than Miller for the purposes of broadcast 
regulation.63 The FCC set a clearer standard for cable
profane" broadcasts. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1464. Pacifica, 438 
U.S. 726 (1978), resolved this apparent conflict. The Court 
declared that: "[S]ection 326 does not limit the FCC's 
authority to sanction licensees who engage in obscene, 
indecent, or profane broadcasting. Though the censorship 
ban precludes editing proposed broadcasts in advance, the 
ban does not deny the FCC the power to review the content of 
completed broadcasts." Id.
60438 U.S at 749.
61438 U.S. 726 (1978), rehearing denied 439 U.S. 883 
(1978) .
6218 U.S.C.A. § 1464.
63Perhaps because the FCC is not supposed to engage in 
censorship. See supra note 59.
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television in 1992,64 specifically advising local cable 
operators to base their programming around the Miller 
s tandard. "65 
Telephone
The emergence of the dial-a-porn industry resulted in 
litigation to clarify how obscenity law would apply to 
possibly obscene telephone transmissions. Telephones, like 
computer systems, are "designed for point-to-point, 
interactive communication,1 unlike cable television or 
broadcasting.66 In fact, the computer systems which create 
cyberspace use telephone wires to make their transmissions 
through modems.
g4See Miller and Van Eaton, supra note 2 (discussion of 
the 1992 Cable Act and its amendments); Krattenmaker and 
Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs; The New 
Morality Meets the New Media. 51 Ford. L. Rev. 606 (1983) 
(discussion of pre-Cable Act attempts at regulation).
The appropriate obscenity standard for direct-broadcast 
satellite television is also problematic. See John V. 
Edwards, Obscenity in the Age of Direct Broadcast Satellite; 
A Final Burial For Stanley v. Georgia (?). A National 
Obscenity Standard, and Other Miscellany, 33 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 949 (1992).
655 8 Fed. Reg. 19623 (1993) at 19624.
“Message, supra note 46 at 1065.
22
The holding of Sable Communications v . FCC,67 required 
the dial-a-porn industry to adhere to local community 
standards, tailoring its messages to meet a variety of local 
obscenity ordinances.68 The Sable decision makes two 
points about the FCC's ability to regulate the dial-a-porn 
industry through Section 223 (b) of the Communications Act 
of 1934, which bans indecent, as well as obscene, interstate 
commercial messages.69 First, § 223 (b) "does not 
unconstitutionally prohibit the interstate transmission of 
obscene commercial telephone message" because obscenity 
receives no First Amendment protection.70 However, the 
FCC's "ban on indecent telephone messages violates the First 
Amendment since the statute's denial of adult access to such 
messages far exceeds that which is necessary to serve the 
compelling interests of preventing minors from being exposed 
to the messages."71
Justice White, writing for the Court, distinguished 
Pacifica's grant of power to regulate indecent radio 
broadcasts, noting that Pacifica did not involve a total ban
67492 U.S. 115 (1989), (striking down congressional ban 
on obscene telephone messages).
68Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). See also Jeffrey L.
Reed, supra note 2 at 363.
69 4 9 2 U.S. 115 (1989) .
70Id.
71Id.
23
on indecent material and relied on the pervasiveness of 
broadcasting, "which can intrude on the privacy of the home 
without prior warning of content and which is uniquely 
accessible to children.1,72 Moreover, the opinion contrasts 
radio with dial-a-porn, which requires the "listener to take 
affirmative steps to receive the communications."73 The 
distinction drawn between the type of media involved in the 
two cases indicates that obscenity and indecency regulation 
in cyberspace could also be affected by the need of computer 
users to first take "affirmative steps" before they can act 
within cyberspace. The Sable court's position on obscenity 
and indecency suggests that in cyberspace, an Internet 
user's indecent speech should receive First Amendment 
protection. However, whether that speech is indecent or 
obscene will be determined by the community standards of the 
user's locality.
Also, as Sable dealt with the prosecution of the 
producer of the messages, the Court largely ignored the 
intriguing question of the appropriateness of regulating 
common carrier telephone companies, which are required to 
ignore the content of the private messages their wires 
transmit.74 As communication in cyberspace ultimately
72Id.
73Id.
74See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988) (Communications Act of
1934), and 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1992). See Message, supra
24
occurs through telephone wires, it would follow that private
computer-generated communications should also be free of
regulatory interference. Although computer networks have
not been designated as such, they appear to meet the Supreme
Court's definition of "common carriers":
A common-carrier service in the communications 
context is one that "makes a public offering to 
provide [communication facilities] whereby all 
members of the public who choose to employ such 
facilities may communicate or transmit 
intelligence of their own design and choosing."75
Sable, however, implies that indecent transmissions over
telephone wires for commercial gain can indeed be regulated
at their source. In cyberspace, this could mean that
electronic mail and chat rooms might be free from any
regulation, whereas commercial enterprises based on
electronic bulletin boards could be censored.
note 46 at 1065.
75Message, supra note 46 at 1066, quoting FCC v. 
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (footnote 
omitted).
Cyberspace: Public or Private?
In July 1994, the Miller test was applied in the very 
first case involving the transmission of obscene images via 
the Internet.76 The outcome of that case reveals that 
community standards do little to clarify what is and what is 
not obscene for the purposes of interlinked computer 
networks, and raises a very important question: is
cyberspace a public area or a private one?
The Case of United States v. Thomas77
In July 1994, a California couple engaged in a 
profitable home business was found guilty of violating 
Memphis, Tennessee's local obscenity standards by 
transmission of obscene images through interstate phone 
lines. Robert and Carleen Thomas were charged with 
violations of Memphis' community standards for obscenity 
when an undercover federal agent posed as a subscriber to 
their members-only78 electronic bulletin board,79 Amateur
76United States v. Thomas, No. 94-2 0019 (W.D. TN) (July 
28, 1994).
77Thomas, No. 94-20019 (W.D. TN July 28, 1994).
78Members could subscribe to the bulletin board for $55
for six months, $99 for a year. Associated Press, Computer 
Porn Trial Breaking New Ground '73 Community Standards
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Action.80 Subscribers could use credit cards to download 
scenes of sexual fetishes, including bestiality.81
The scenes the Thomases sent to Memphis were not 
considered obscene by their own local California 
standards.82 Prosecutors, however, felt that the fact that 
the images were obscene by Memphis standards was enough of a 
violation to justify bringing federal charges83 of
Ruling May fc»et stern Test, Fla. Sun Sentinel, Palm Beach 
edition, July 21, 1994, at 4A.
79Electronic bulletin boards (or "newsgroups") are 
publicly accessible and their current numbers are estimated 
between 50,00-100,000 in the United States. They include an 
enormous array of subjects, and "most are established by 
hobbyists and consist of a single computer and phone line. 
Some are profitable businesses with hundreds of thousands of 
subscribers. Callers, dialing in via computer, can post and 
read messages and retrieve files consisting of text, images 
or computer software." Landis, supra note 5.
80Thomas, No. 94-20019 (W.D. TN, July 28, 1994).
81Id.
82Robert Thomas has been quoted as saying: "Everything
I have on my bulletin board can be purchased on the street 
in San Francisco." Computer Porn, supra note 41.
83See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1465, 1466 (1994). § 1466 (a)
provides in part that: "[W]hoever is engaged in the
business of selling or transferring obscene matter, . . .,
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transmitting obscenity through interstate telephone 
lines.84 A Memphis jury convicted the Thomases on eleven 
counts of obscenity violations, and sentenced Robert and 
Carleen Thomas to 3 6 and 3 0 months in jail, respectively.85 
Their conviction was recently upheld by a federal appellate 
court.86
The appellate court's opinion is extremely limiting. 
Judge Nancy Edmunds, writing for the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, rejected the Thomases' argument that Congress did 
not intend for 18 U.S.C. § 1465 to regulate intangible 
objects like computer transmissions; the court also 
rejected their assertion that the Congressional intent not 
to regulate computer transmissions is evinced by the lack of 
an express prohibition of such conduct in the statute.87 
The opinion holds that the images were tangible at both 
their source and their destination, and are therefore
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce, shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
more than 5 years or by a fine under this title, or both." 
Id.
84Thomas, No. 94-20019 (W.D. TN, July 28, 1994).
85Id.
86United States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 7 01, 1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
87Id. at *7.
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tangible images for the purpose of federal regulation.88 
In addition, the court points out that their duty to 
interpret federal statutes is to "construe the language so 
as to give effect to the intent of Congress, "89 which they 
found here to be the prevention of interstate transmission 
of obscene materials by any and all means.90
The Thomas ruling, which holds operators of electronic 
bulletin boards to the community standards of any locality, 
actually subverts completely the entire rationale of 
community standards, which was to allow communities to set 
their own levels of "acceptable" obscenity. The opposite 
occurred in the Thomas case: Californians, selling
88Id. at *11.
89Id. at *12 (quoting United States v. Underhill, 813 
F. 2d 105, 111 (6th Cir.), cert, denied. 482 U.S. 906 (1987) 
(quoting United States v. American Trucking Associations, 
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940)).
90Id. at *14. To support this conclusion, the court 
cited a military case where it was held that § 1465's 
silence as to computer transmissions was irrelevant, because 
"it is clear Congress intended to stem the transportation of 
obscene material in interstate commerce regardless of the 
means used to effect that end." Id., quoting United States 
v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 1995 WL 259269 (A.F . Ct. Crim. App. 
1995) at *10.
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pornography deemed not obscene by their own community,91 
were held to the dictates of communities in Tennessee, who 
did consider the pornography obscene.92
This is an especially worrisome development in the 
context of the Internet, because operators of bulletin 
boards usually cannot screen out calls from any one 
locality,93 essentially leaving their operators subject to 
the obscenity laws of every community in America.94 Even 
if operators could prevent callers from areas where the 
material sought would be obscene, they are still obligated
91Much pornography is not legally obscene. Plavbov and 
Penthouse, for example, display "soft-core" pornography 
which is rarely, if ever, found to be legally obscene. Mike 
Godwin, Problems Policing Porn On-Line: Community Standards
Difficult to Ad d Iv in Cvbersoace. The San Francisco 
Examiner, August 14, 1994.
92Thomas. No. 94-20019 (W.D. TN, July 28, 1994) .
93Distributors of books, magazines, and videos which 
may be obscene can avoid shipping to areas where they could 
face prosecution. Operators of bulletin board systems, who 
use telephone lines, cannot control from whom who they 
receive calls. Landis, supra note 5.
94For a general discussion of legal issues affecting 
operators of computer information systems, see David Loundy, 
E-Law; Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems 
and System Operator Liability. 12 Computer L.J. 101 (1993).
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to know every local obscenity law in the country. Although 
it has been posited that in the future, operators of 
electronic networks will resemble telephone companies in 
that they will be considered "conduits more than 
editors,"95 the Thomas case suggests that at present, 
operators of electronic bulletin boards will be held to the 
standards of editors who review and are responsible for 
every word or image in their form of media.96 
Do Electronic Transmissions "Pollute" an Electronic 
Community?
The Thomas decision seems even more unfair when one 
considers that the Supreme Court has upheld the right to 
possess pornography in the privacy of one's home. Writing 
for the Court in Stanley v, Georgia,97 Justice Thurgood
95Message, supra note 46 at 1084. See also id. at 
1088-98 for an in-depth discussion of the future of all 
First Amendment regulation on the information superhighway.
96Thomas, No. 94-20019 (W.D. TN, July 28, 1994).
97394 U.S. 557 (1969). Pornography depicting children, 
however, receives no First Amendment protection under any 
circumstances if states choose to criminalize even its 
private possession. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). See David
B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated Child 
Pornography Can be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 Alb. L.J. 
Sci. & Tech. 311 (1994) for a discussion of the problematic 
nature of computer-generated obscene images, with particular
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Marshall stated: " [i]£ the First Amendment means anything,
it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting 
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films 
he may watch."98 However, the Court has construed that 
holding very narrowly. Although commentators have observed 
that "one may enjoy obscene material in one's own home, ... 
virtually any process that leads to such possession may be 
declared illegal,"99 implying that the business o£ 
obscenity necessarily "pollutes" a community.100
However, in the context of cyberspace, purchasers of 
pornography have it transmitted directly to their home 
computers. As they must log on or subscribe to a service, 
potentially obscene materials do not interact with either 
the cyberspace community or the purchaser's physical
emphasis on those involving the depiction of children.
98Id. at 565.
"Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9 at § 16.61 (a).
100United States v. Orita, 413 U.S. 139 (1978) 
(transporting obscene material for eventual private use in 
the home); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) 
(receipt of obscene materials through the mails); Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), rehearing 
denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973), on remand 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E. 
2d 456 (1973), certiorari denied, 418 U.S. 939 (1974), 
rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 887 (1974) (voluntarily seeking
obscene materials).
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surroundings. The transaction is completely private; only 
those persons who have sought out such materials receive 
exposure to them. The Thomases' ostensible "polluting" took 
place during the split-second transmission of their images 
to Tennessee -- a transmission initiated not by them, but by 
the undercover agent in Memphis.
As one First Amendment lawyer has pointed out, 
"electronic material travels invisibly from one computer to 
another,"101 and "in electronic ether ... with the 
exception of electrons moving at the speed of light, there 
is no community interface.1,102 Mike Godwin, attorney for 
the Electronic Freedom Foundation, has argued that 
"pornography inevitably finds its way into any new 
technology and that since computer networks come directly 
into the home, they may have a much less intrusive impact on 
communities than older methods of pornography 
distribution. "103 
On-Line Business On the Line
Although the debate about distribution highlights 
cyberspace as a private area, pornography is ultimately a
101Landis, supra note 5.
102See Landis, supra note 5.
103A11 Things Considered; Couple Found Guilty of 
Selling Pornography on Internet (National Public Radio 
broadcast, July 29, 1994)(Transcript #1558-4).
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money-making venture, especially in electronic media,104 
and such businesses are generally considered within the 
public realm. Many operators are choosing to limit business 
activities which are perfectly legal in their own 
communities, hoping that self-censorship will ward off 
obscenity prosecutions where their product is illegal. 
Community standards' potential chilling effect on business 
was a concern first expressed by Justice William Brennan 
thirty years prior to U.S. v. Thomas. In 1964, he wrote 
that applying local standards to obscene materials meant 
that dissemination of such materials might be curtailed 
because sellers would be unwilling to risk convictions under
104Although exact estimates on the number of sexually 
explicit electronic bulletin boards vary, the July 1994 
compilation of the most "trafficked" discussion groups 
listed three sexually-oriented ones in its top ten: 
alt.sex.stories., alt.binaries.pictures.erotica, and 
alt.sex. Landis, supra note 5. Each group had more than 
2 00,000 readers in July 1994. Id.
Some have remarked on studies which identify 90% of on­
line system users as unmarried white men between the ages of 
21 and 30 and posited that the prominence of sex-oriented 
bulletin boards will continue until women users are a more 
palpable presence in cyberspace. See Fran Maier,
Women,Not@CvberWorld. Wash. Post, April 16, 1995 at Cl.
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varying obscenity standards depending upon the locale.105
Additionally, Justice Brennan was concerned with 
arbitrary enforcement of community standards, given that 
some states zealously prosecute obscenity violations while 
others are far more lenient on possible offenders.106 In
105Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 193-195 (1964) 
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Goldberg, J.).
106Of particular relevance to the issue of possible 
vigorous prosecution of offenses is a state's initial 
definition of obscenity. Although most are based on the 
Miller standard, they vary widely from state to state. See, 
e.cr.. Cal. Penal Code § 311 (Deering 1995); 111. Rev. Stat. 
ch. 38, para. 11-20 (1994); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-49-1-1 
(Burns 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4301 (c) (1994); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91.11 (A) (3) (West 1993); Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.579 (365) (Callaghan 1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 45- 
8-201 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-01 (1993); Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5903 (B) (1994); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-372
(Michie 1994) .
Some states, however, have limited the rights of 
localities to further regulate obscenity. See, e.g., Mich. 
Stat. Ann. § 2 8.579 (370) (allows exemption for zoning 
laws); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-12 (1993). Other states 
have acted affirmatively to allow their municipalities to 
regulate obscenity further than the state itself. See, 
e.g.. Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4301 (f) (3) (1994); La. Rev.
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fact, the Thomas' lawyer/ unsuccessfully argued before the 
trial that federal prosecutors had shopped around for an 
area traditionally conservative on obscenity issues and 
generally "computer-illiterate, 1,107 in order to make their 
case against the Thomases as strong as possible.108 
The Problem of Juvenile Access
Although concern over children's potential exposure to 
obscenity has been a major factor in the efforts to regulate 
cyberspace, children are not exposed to on-line obscenity 
the moment they turn on the family computer. Like Playboy, 
computer-generated obscenity must be subscribed to, or 
purchased item by item. Cyberspace users with no wish to 
view obscene images simply do not subscribe to bulletin 
boards which specialize in them. Accordingly, the danger to 
children generally results from their own curiosity.
As such, the problem of juvenile access can be dealt 
with through the use of parental control, either by direct 
supervision of their children's computer time, or through 
use of software devices that would allow them to block out
Stat. Ann. § 91.11 (C) (1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-201
(5) (1994) .
107Associated Press, Computer Porn Trial Breaking New 
Ground '73 Community Standards Ruling Mav Get Stern Test, as 
reported in Sun Sentinel (FL), Palm Beach Edition, Thursday 
July 21, 1994, at 4A.
108Computer Porn, supra note 41.
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"dirty" cybersites,109 much like cable television allows 
the blocking out of adult channels. Several companies now 
offer software to enabling parents to exercise control over 
what on-line topics are accessible to their children.110 
In addition, nearly all of the major servers such as America 
On-Line have built-in parental control features.
109See. e.g., Lawrence Magid, Sen. Exon's Censors Are 
Set a Little High for the Internet. Wash. Post, March 14, 
1995, at F18. Magid argues that the preservation of free 
speech on the Internet is threatened by the Communications 
Decency Act in the name of protecting children. "I worry 
that some overzealous prosecutor, anywhere in the country, 
might use this law to go after a discussion of reproductive 
rights, birth control abortion, gay rights, or any other 
intensely debated subject." Id. Magid asserts that parents 
"have other ways to protect their children," Id., from 
obscenity on the Internet. He refers concerned parents to 
his booklet "Child Safety on the Information Superhighway," 
which is available through the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children. Id.
110Such programs include "Cybersitter," which screens 
words in context so that a question about the sex of an 
individual would not be blocked, while a "lurid question" 
would; in addition, programs like "Surfwatch" now offer 
parents the ability to block sites for violence. Parental 
Control Ware. Newsweek, February 12, 1996, at 12.
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Another potential answer is to have electronic boards 
"rated" for obscene conduct as are video games, movies, and 
musical releases. This suggestion might be feasible for 
boards that download images, but likely would not work on 
discussion boards, which involve members from around the 
world sharing their thoughts via the computer screen. 
Operators of boards could caution users to keep their talk 
within certain obscenity limits, but could not guarantee 
their compliance.111
In sum, the question of juvenile access demonstrates 
the dual nature of cyberspace as both a public and private 
area. Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
legitimate interests of states in regulating the 
dissemination of obscene material when the method of 
distribution "carries with it a significant danger of 
offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of
lxlThere are differing approaches to control of messages 
posted on electronic bulletin boards. See Schlachter, supra 
note 5 at § IV B 1. Prodigy considers itself responsible 
for its users' messages and thus has editorial discretion 
not to print all submitted messages. Id. (citing Marianne 
Taylor, Users Sav Computer Network is Muzzling Their Give- 
and-Take, Chi. Trib., Jan. 7, 1991, at Cl, quoting Martha 
Griffin, Prodigy spokesperson). CompuServe will remove 
obscene or offensive messages if users complain. Id.
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exposure to juveniles,1,112 cyberspace exists outside the 
traditional public boundaries of local communities113 and 
can be prevented from inadvertently affecting unwilling 
viewers through technological controls.114 As the "public" 
aspects of cyberspace are easily circumvented, one would 
think that Americans would be willing to view it primarily 
as a private area. However, both the Thomas case and new 
legislation indicate that as yet, our society is unwilling 
to do so.
112Miller. 413 U.S. 15 at 18-19. See also Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 637-643 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 
767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 
(1964) .
113,1 [N] ew problems in cyberspace will arise from the 
fact that residents of cyberspace are also residents of 
"real" spaces; they will thus be members of two (or more) 
different communities." Hardy, supra note 4 at 1012.
114A1though these arguments make it seem increasingly 
unreasonable to apply community standards on obscenity to a 
medium which does not actually affect its community, courts 
must keep in mind that the situation may have changed by the 
time new regulations could be implemented. Interactivity, 
in particular, is beginning to characterize all forms of 
electronic media, and the relative passivity of media 
subscribers may not exist in the future.
A Cyberspace Standard for Obscenity:
The Communications Decency Act and Alternatives 
Legislators soon recognized that it would be easiest to 
regulate cyberspace through action at the federal level.
The Communications Decency Act of 1995 was one of several 
proposals made in response to concerns over the de facto 
application of community standards in cyberspace. This 
"anything goes,"115 standard, which resulted in very few 
prosecutions, was too expansive for the liking of Senators 
Jim Exon and Slade Gorton, backers of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1995,116 signed into law on February 8, 1996 
as a small part of an important telecommunications bill 
supported by the Clinton administration.
Criminalizing "Indecent" Speech in Cyberspace
The Act modified the 1992 Communications Act117 to 
allow criminal liability to be imposed on the transmitters 
of computer messages which are "obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, or indecent."118 The primary objectives of the 
bill's sponsors are the protection of children from
115Steven Levy, Indecent Proposal: Censor the Net,
Newsweek, April 3, 1995, at 53.
116S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
11747 USC § 223 (1992) .
118S. 314 at Sec. 223.
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"pornography and smut," "computer stalking and inappropriate 
contact with children."119 In addition, Representative 
Henry Hyde, an opponent of abortion, added language which 
applies the Comstock Act of 1873 to cyberspace, resulting in 
a ban on discussions of abortion and birth control.120
The Act's passage touched off a storm of protest. 
Thousands of World Wide Web site operators turned their 
screen backgrounds black, the "cyberspace equivalent of book 
burning," according to Jerrold Nadler, cyberspace user and 
U.S. Representative.121 Over twenty groups filed suit in 
federal court in Philadelphia, challenging the Act's 
constitutionality.122 In New York, a district judge denied 
requests for an order restraining the government from 
enforcing the anti-abortion speech section of the Act after 
"receiving assurances from the U.S. attorney that the
119See Jim Exon, We Can't Allow Smut on the Internet, 
Wash. Post, March 9, 1995, at A2 0.
120Peter H. Lewis, Protest. Cvber-style, for New Law,
The New York Times, February 8, 1996, at A16.
121Id.
122Communications Decency Act 96; First Wave of 
Lashbacks, Online Libraries and Microcomputers, March 1, 
1996. The coalition includes, among others, the ACLU, the 
Society of Professional Journalists, and the San Francisco 
Bay Guardian. Legal representation will be provided by the 
First Amendment Project.
41
government would not prosecute people who discuss abortion 
on-line." The judge pointed out that the Department of 
Justice considers the Comstock law unconstitutional and has 
not enforced it in twenty years.123 Kate Michelman, 
president of the National Abortion rights Action League, 
expressed her dissatisfaction with the judge's decision by 
pointing out that such promises extend only through the end 
of the Clinton administration, and that Americans "cannot be 
subject to changing political winds on so critical a 
matter.1,124
In addition, Senators Leahy and Feingold immediately 
introduced a bill to repeal the Communications Decency Act. 
Senator Feingold stated that the Act, "while well- 
intentioned, is improperly targeted at so-called 'indecent' 
speech on the Internet which is protected by the First 
Amendment."125 He pointed out that criminal statutes, like 
the ones used to prosecute the Thomases, already served to 
punish illegal distribution of obscenity. The Senator 
argued that the Act does nothing further "to protect 
children on-line," while "compromis[ing] the right of every
^ Telecommunications; Judcre Rejects One Abortion- 
Specific Suit, Abortion Report, February 9, 1996.
124Id.
125Russell Feingold, Senator, Senate, Leahy-Feingold 
Bill Introduced to Repeal New Internet Censorship, 
Congressional Press release, February 9, 1996.
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American to free speech."126
An Inappropriate Method
Further, critics charge that the Act fails to consider
the unique nature of communication in cyberspace, which can:
resemble postal mail, coffee klatsches, public 
lectures, academic seminars, locker-room banter, 
and print periodicals . . . [I]n none of these
venues would we welcome regulations where fines 
and prison sentences would be doled out for 
uttering certain expletives that, though once 
considered scandalous, are now fairly ubiquitous 
in our culture. . . if a magazine that commonly
runs some of those nasty words in its pages - say.
The New Yorker - decided to put its contents on­
line, its leaders would be liable for a $100,000 
fine and two years in jail.127
The variegated nature of cyberspace communications
emphasizes the unsuitability of the Communications Decency
Act as a regulator of potentially obscene speech on the
Internet. Many of its goals could be met in ways that would
not so severely restrict freedom of speech in
cyberspace.128
If cyberspace must be policed for obscenity, almost any 
other standard would be more appropriate than that provided 
by the Communications Decency Act. Another standard would 
also have a better chance of surviving a constitutional
126Id.
127See Levy, supra note 115.
128See Ken E. Weine, The Communications Decency Act:
Too Deep, Too Broad, Too Much, N.Y. L. J., March 15, 1995 at 
2 .
43
challenge; the Act's criminalization of indecent speech in 
cyberspace is prima facie unconstitutional as the Supreme 
Court has emphatically declared that indecent speech merits 
First Amendment protection.129 Additionally, the 
technological feasibility and relative inexpensiveness of 
software blocking devices emphasize that the sweeping taboos 
of the Communications Decency Act are ridiculously broad.
As the Act has already elicited a number of legal 
challenges, alternatives that can constitutionally regulate 
obscenity in cyberspace while protecting "indecent" speech 
merit discussion.
Legislative Options
Two existing bills may offer alternative legislative 
options to the Communications Decency Act. The "Protection 
of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995" would 
place criminal liability on any electronic bulletin board 
operator who knowingly transmits indecent material to anyone 
under the age of eighteen.130 Penalties include both fines 
and prison terms. Although this bill also addresses 
indecent speech, it does so in a manner appropriate under 
the current constitutional regime; pornography is illegal
129See. e.g., FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), 
rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978); Sable Communications
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
130Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, Regulation of On- 
Line Services, N.Y.L.J., August 22, 1995, at 3.
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for sale to minors regardless of whether it is obscene or 
indecent under local laws. This would eliminate the problem 
of determining what is obscene and what is indecent under 
local community standards; however, debate would be sure to 
ensue about the definition of "pornography."
By contrast, the "Internet Freedom and Family 
Empowerment Act" prohibits Internet regulation by the 
Federal Communications Commission. The bill creates a 
national policy on use and development of the Internet, 
which it praises as "an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources" 
which "offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, 
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity."131
Moreover, the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment 
Act fosters parental control over access to cyberspace and 
encourages the development of parental control devices. It 
includes a "Good Samaritan" provision designed to allow 
cyberspace users who already act to inhibit the distribution 
of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable material"132 to 
continue to do so. This clause allows continued use of 
obscenity control measures, such as those already in place 
at the larger on-line service companies. However, although
131Id.
132Id.
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this bill is friendly to Internet users and certainly 
encourages the expansion of cyberspace, its adoption would 
return us to basing on-line obscenity prosecutions on 
community standards alone, as in the Thomas case.
Cyberspace As A Community
As an alternative to the community standards doctrine 
has yet to be found, perhaps the simplest way to regulate 
obscenity in cyberspace is to declare it a community all its 
own. Under current law, this would require that Internet 
users determine a set of "community standards" which courts 
could then apply to obscenity cases within the cyberspace 
community as they would in any other locale.
Declaring cyberspace to be a community of its own is an 
attractive option; however, it is also a problematic one.
It is highly unlikely that a uniform "community standard" 
could be agreed upon by users of the Internet, as there are 
"differing interest groups all across cyberspace."133 One 
main attraction of the Internet, after all, is the 
incredible variety of its user pool. All sorts of people, 
from all over the world, log on to the Internet to chat, 
debate, and exchange ideas; it is hardly fair to request 
that such a diverse group make a decision which even the 
Supreme Court found itself unable to articulate on a
133See Hardy, supra note 4 at 1013.
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national scale.134
134In addition, the question of to what degree Internet 
users reasonably are subject to a particular court's 
jurisdiction raises thorny problems. Subscribers to on-line 
systems are in effect possessed of "dual citizenship,1 in 
cyberspace and in "real space." Hardy, supra note 4. 
Although prior court holdings have subjected people to 
jurisdiction in areas to which they reached out, in those 
cases the parties knew to what locality their actions were 
directed. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985). On-line subscribers do not necessarily know to what 
geographic area their communications are directed; 
accordingly, proprietors of bulletin board systems do not 
necessarily know the origins of its subscriber base.
If the Internet were declared a community of its own, 
the knotty issue of whether or not international users of 
the network who violated the "community standard" could be 
prosecuted under American obscenity laws is certain to 
arise. Fairness would seem to require a more direct attempt 
to reach American markets before foreign subscribers could 
be held liable for violations of American law. See, e.g.. 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 
U.S. 102 (1987), 702 P. 2d 543 (1986), 39 Cal. 3d 35 (1986). 
There is the additional question of how willing other 
nations would be to assist the United States in such 
adjudications against its citizens.
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Overturning Miller
The difficulties involved in applying existing 
obscenity law to cyberspace demonstrate the more general 
failings of the "community standards" doctrine as it applies 
to America as a whole. As one commentator has noted, the 
idea of "culturally distinct geographical locations may 
simply be obsolete in this age of cyberspace."135 For that 
reason, overturning Miller and adopting a clearer definition 
of what is obscene for use in all media is an attractive 
option. Ideally, a new obscenity regime would accommodate 
the expansion and development of new technologies and would 
broadly define obscenity to allow room for speech that 
society values, such as political debate over abortion now 
technically illegal in cyberspace. A new national standard 
for obscenity and indecency could include reasonable 
controls on speech designed to limit access to children.
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, it seems 
unlikely that we will ever be willing to abandon regulation 
of obscene and indecent speech. In the companion case to 
Miller, Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton,136 the Court
For these reasons, some commentators have advocated the 
creation of "cybercourts," which could act as a "virtual 
forum" for the adjudication of disputes worldwide. See 
Resnick, supra note 4 at Al.
135A11 Things Considered, supra note 103.
136413 U.S. 49 (1973) .
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acknowledged that: " [T]here are legitimate state interests
at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity
... [t]hese include the interests of the public in the
quality of life and the total community environment, the
tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly,
the public safety itself."137 And in the years prior to
Miller, Chief Justice Warren wrote that there is a "right of
the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society,"
which must be balanced against "the right of individuals to
express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 138
Efforts to balance concern over the quality of life and
the right of individual expression have given rise to
suggestions of obscenity regulation like the "Plain Brown
Wrapper Principle."
The Plain Brown Wrapper Principle is this: The
government may not prohibit the free trade of 
obscene or indecent speech in the general 
marketplace, but it may require that all obscene 
or indecent speech be packaged and disseminated in 
a manner that substantially diminishes exposure to 
such speech to children or involuntary exposure to 
such speech in genuine captive audience
137Id. at 57-58.
138 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)(Warren,
C.J., dissenting). See also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 
U.S. 413, 457 (1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting); Beauharnais 
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949).
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situations.139
Such theories seem far better equipped than the Miller 
standard to keep in equipoise both one's right of free 
expression and one's right to avoid the free expression of 
others. Use of a "Plain Brown Wrapper Principle" on-line 
would encourage the employment of cyberspace's own 
technology to weed out whatever users did not wish to see, 
while still permitting the open exchange the medium makes 
possible.140
139Smolla, supra note 40 at 330.
140Smolla/ supra note 40 at 330-334.
Conclusion
One legal commentator of a historical bent has noted 
that "the Internet's Jeffersonian beginnings are already 
spawning a Hamiltonian backlash.1,141 Many Americans 
consider the explosion of electronic communications a modern 
example of the truth of Jefferson's observation that "free 
communication among the people ... [is] the only effective 
guardian of every other right."142 Others, however, 
consider cyberspace a hotbed of "public licentiousness," 
agreeing with Hamilton's view on the dangers of "danc[ing] 
to the tune of liberty without law."143 As these 
factions struggle to decide how we will regulate obscenity 
in cyberspace, its new technologies are stretching our 
"legal creativity"144 to the limit.
As a place with both public and private aspects, 
cyberspace is perhaps the ideal arena in which to experiment 
with new ideas about ways to control obscenity and indecency 
in media. Further, as it seems unlikely that the harsh 
strictures of the Communications Decency Act will survive 
judicial scrutiny, an alternative means of regulation will 
be needed to preserve free speech in cyberspace. It will be
141David Post, New Rules for the 'Net?, The American 
Lawyer, July August 1995, at 112.
142Id.
143 Id.
144Waggoner, supra note 4.
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a challenging prospect, but the First Amendment has 
accommodated new technologies before, and there is every 
reason to believe that it will again.
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